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Purpose: This article focuses on 10 case studies of
companies/organizations that are part of the current
innovation ecosystem of regenerative medicine (RM) in
the United Kingdom. It analyzes the actors, linkages,
and inﬂuences that will determine the future shape of
the RM industry sector and its capacity to live up to its
initial expectations.
Methods: Using the case study approach, purpo-
sive sampling was used to get 18 interview respond-
ents from 10 RM companies/organizations in the
United Kingdom. We used semistructured interviews
for data gathering and thematic analysis for identifying
gaps in the RM value chain (ie, the range of activities
required for bringing a product from conception to
market and end-use) and the inﬂuences of the innova-
tion ecosystem on the evolving RM business models.
Findings: RM promises to address currently unmet
health care needs by restoring the normal form and
function of cells, tissues, and organs. The innovations
emerging to support the progress of RM to satisfy
these important health care markets will disrupt the
business models of incumbent industry sectors, partic-
ularly pharmaceuticals. Companies involved in this
area must develop innovative business models and
value chains and negotiate the complex inﬂuences of
the innovation ecosystem, including regulatory sys-
tems and standards, ﬁnancial support systems, and
new market dynamics.
Implications: This article highlights the needs for
more systemic analyses of the needs of potentially disrup-
tive innovations, in RM and more widely, and for policy-
makers to give greater attention to these insights in
planning regulatory and other supporting initiatives, with
the promotion of innovation in mind. (Clin Ther.
2018;40:10841094) © 2018 The Authors. Published by1084Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
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Regenerative medicine (RM) is a disruptive innovation
set to change therapy for intractable medical conditions.
It departs from conventional therapy because of its claim
to cure rather than merely treat chronic conditions; and
the necessity for new forms of clinical delivery collabora-
tions between therapy manufacturers and surgeons.
However, there are concerns that the translation of dis-
ruptive RM innovations may be slow or fail to material-
ize.1 Gardner et al1 suggested, "RM products and
procedures will have to work very hard to ﬁnd or create
an adoption space if translation into clinic is to be suc-
cessful." Our article builds on the discussion by Gardner
et al1 of translational challenges in the context of clinical
trials; regulatory norms; manufacturing, scale-up, and
logistics; reimbursement and commissioning; and clini-
cal adoption. However, we focus on RM business mod-
els; gaps in the RM value chain (ie, the range of
activities required for bringing a product from concep-
tion to market and end-use); and challenges, from the
innovation ecosystem, facing the emerging RM business
models, in the context of the United Kingdom.
There are 2 important RM therapy categories: (1)
autologous, in which a patient's own cells areby/4.0/)
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clinical setting; and reintroduced into the same patient;
and (2) allogeneic, in which different patients receive
cells manufactured in a central facility, from a single
donor.2,3 The choice of autologous or allogeneic ther-
apy is determined by disease area, the availability of
therapy, or regulatory pressure on developers.4 We
argue that accelerating the clinical adoption of RM
will depend on an innovation ecosystem that facilitates
faster integration of RM and allied business models to
form viable value chains,3 aided by proportionate and
adaptive governance systems.5 Regarding value chain
gaps and innovation ecosystem challenges facing RM
business models, we accept Faulkner's6 assertion that
RM is a site for "opposing forces for gatekeeping and
innovation." The key to resolving these opposing
forces, in keeping with the EU's innovation principle,7
is to develop regulatory systems that are more propor-
tionate and adaptive to the needs of new technologies
than are those currently in operation, involving more
creative use of standards and guidelines.8 Downstream,
innovation ecosystem challenges need to be resolved, in
particular the adoption of RM therapies by clinical
practice, as exempliﬁed by the UK government's effort
to establish advanced-therapy clinical centers and reim-
bursement. Mahalatchimy9 discussed 2 routes of reim-
bursement: (1) health technology assessment, for
larger-scale disease populations; and (2) highly special-
ized technology evaluation, for rare diseases (which is
more appropriate for many RM therapies).
In this article, we discuss the value chain gaps and
innovation ecosystem challenges facing the evolving
RM business models in the United Kingdom. The anal-
ysis has 3 categories: (1) nonintegrated value chains;
(2) technology and delivery models gap; and (3) dispro-
portionate and nonadaptive governance systems. The
discussion of each category contains illustrative exam-
ples: for nonintegrated value chain, manufacturing
gap, clinical adoption gap, and translational services
gap; for technology and delivery models gap, different
dynamics for autologous and allogeneic therapies, RM
logistics issues, and national regulatory and reimburse-
ment systems; and for disproportionate and nonadap-
tive governance systems, ﬁrst-mover disadvantages of
regulatory learning and costs, and limited patient num-
bers for clinical trials in small indication.
In the rest of the article, business models, innovation
ecosystems, and the framework used by STRATIS (Stra-
tegic Planning of Advanced Technological InnovationJuly 2018Systems) framework are brieﬂy discussed; and ﬁndings,
a discussion, and conclusions are presented.
Materials and Methods
Using the case study approach, purposive sampling
was used to get 18 interview respondents from 10 RM
companies/organizations in the United Kingdom. We
used semistructured interviews for data gathering and
thematic analysis for identifying value chain gaps and
the inﬂuence of the innovation ecosystem on the evolv-
ing RM business models.TAGGEDH1RESULTSTAGGEDEND
Regenerative Medicine Business Models and Value
Chains
Business models are frameworks of understanding the
logic of an enterprise, that is, how it creates and appropri-
ates value from its unique product(s) and service(s) offer-
ing(s). A business model describes, "for a sector or sub-
sector, how ﬁrms operating within it can create, capture
and deliver value. It acts as a guide to incumbent and
future businesses aiming to increase the amount of value
they can create or capture, often through the adoption of
innovative technology."8 In this article, we use the 6 RM
business models (Figure 1) identiﬁed by Banda et al (per-
sonal communication, [2018]), deﬁned as follows:
 Materials and service provision business model. These
ﬁrms or organizations supply raw materials, reagents,
machinery, and other equipment and quality-assurance
services to RM ﬁrms/organizations. They derive value
from offering services and products for RM activities
spanning preclinical, efﬁcacy, and tolerability testing.
 Early exit Phase I/II business model. These ﬁrms or
organizations focus on the early stages of develop-
ment of RM therapy. They capture intellectual prop-
erty after developing innovative products, processes,
and platform technologies. They appropriate value
by progressing therapies to proof-of-concept or
Phase I/II clinical trials or trials demonstrating efﬁ-
cacy and tolerability, and exit the RM value chain
by selling off intellectual property or technology to
more resourced ﬁrms, for example "big pharma."
 Manufacturing and scale-up business model. These
ﬁrms or organizations specialize in investing in current
Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP)-compliant
plants and contract manufacture therapies for other
RM ﬁrms. They also assist other ﬁrms in developing1085
Figure 1. Six emerging UK regenerative medicine business models.
Clinical Therapeuticsthe manufacturing procedure, scaling up their
manufacturing capabilities, and producing cells for
clinical trials.
 Translational services business model. These ﬁrms
provide technological, business development, and
regulatory advisory services as well as physical
infrastructure (eg, cGMP plants) to support small to
medium enterprises (SMEs) without in-house capa-
bilities. They de-risk the early stages of therapy
development, allowing SMEs to delay investing in
cGMP plants and related skills.
 Virtual business model. These prerevenue SMEs opt
to buy-in services and products from manufacturing
and scale-up or translational services providers to
avoid quickly running down their funds by carrying
out the activities themselves.
 Integrated business model. This model incorporates
all of the other 5 models, and the ﬁrm controls the
laboratory-to-patient translational activities for a
chosen therapy because it has internal technological,
ﬁnancial, and management capabilities. None of the
organizations we studied displayed this model.
These business models are interlinked to form value
chains. We conceptualize value chains as describing1086"the full range of activities required to bring a product
from conception to market and end use, including
design, production, marketing, distribution and sup-
port to the ﬁnal consumer. It can be covered by a sin-
gle, probably large, ﬁrm or involve multiple ﬁrms,
nationally or globally. Each ﬁrm will be working to a
different business model, appropriate to their role in
the overall value chain."8 We bring together the busi-
ness models and value chains in the methodology of
Stratis,10 which brings together a range of aspects
of value chain analysis for the development of RM
therapies, including market identiﬁcation, complex
manufacturing processes and their scale and location
in the value chain, distribution processes for vulnerable
living materials, partner selection and collaborative/
networking approaches, intellectual property and
access to cell lines, management of clinical trials and
other regulatory approval processes, control of costs,
and identiﬁcation of alternative sources of value.
We borrow aspects of an innovation ecosystem from
Adner,11 who deﬁned it as "the collaborative arrange-
ments through which ﬁrms combine their individual
offerings into a coherent, customer facing solution."
Adner11 argues that the innovation ecosystem leverages
synergies across multiple ﬁrms/organizations to bringVolume 40 Number 7
G. Banda et al.value to a customer that no ﬁrm/organization could
singly deliver. We depart from his approach slightly
because he describes mature markets, and their deﬁni-
tion is what we call the value chain. We consider the
life sciences innovation ecosystem to include the value
chain, all of the other things in which the value chain is
embedded (the system's environment), as well as exter-
nal inﬂuences such as regulation and national or
regional innovation systems. We however adopt the 3
risks that are characteristic of innovation ecosystems—
initiative risk, interdependency risk, and integration
risk—from a value chain perspective. Adner11 deﬁnes
the risks as follows: initiative risk is "the familiar
uncertainties of managing a project"; interdependency
risk is "the uncertainties of coordination with comple-
mentary innovators"; and integrative risk is "the
uncertainties presented by the adoption process across
the value chain." This conceptualization is relevant to
understanding that the RM sector is at a stage at which
collaboration with competitors is problematic and thus
the ﬁrms are likely to face different dynamics for initia-
tive, integrative, and interdependency risks as they
negotiate the 6 business models discussed earlier. For
example, in integrative risk, the higher the number of
actors in a value chain, the higher the number of
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July 2018reaches the market, which we focus on when we discuss
value chain gaps. As ﬁrms transition from development
to clinical adoption, they need to choose other businesses
to work with to deliver value to the patient, and the
National Health Service will be a key player as industry
experts perceive that the value of RM is predicated on
the value chain for blood, tissues, cells, and organs—
areas of expertise for blood transfusion services.
Value Chain Gaps and Innovation Ecosystem
Challenges Facing RM Business Models
The following 3 categories (Table 1) illustrate our
argument about the effects of nonintegrated value
chains and innovation ecosystem vacuum on evolving
RM business models. These ﬁndings are based on 10
case studies of RM organizations that we studied
between 2015 and 2017. Eighteen semistructured
interviews were recorded and transcribed. The names
of the organizations and interviewees have been anony-
mized.
Nonintegrated Value Chains
In the early stages of RM businesses, value chain
development and integration are crucial, and this was
conﬁrmed by interviewees who forecasted that in the
coming years, ﬁrms' time and effort would be devotedstem vacuum on evolving regenerative medicine busi-
Effects
ts and lack of capacity for clinical production
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Clinical Therapeuticsto developing robust products and processes for clini-
cal trials and marketing authorization.
Manufacturing Gaps—Public Investment in
Innovation Infrastructure
In mature technologies, different businesses with dif-
ferent business models link up to form viable value
chains. However, in RM value chains, there are still
gaps. Certain crucial functions have no players due to
market failure, for example, lack of regulatory
approved facilities for clinical grade cell manufacture,
as the under-resourced SMEs cannot invest in these
expensive plants. cGMP clean rooms are key
manufacturing cost drivers for SMEs, with basic main-
tenance costs of around £250,000 (US »$334,500) per
annum. Of the 6 business models, only 2, the
manufacturing and scale-up model and the integrated
business model, can afford to construct cGMP plants.
Since there are yet no integrated business model actors,
only a few private sector manufacturing and scale-up
business model players are active in this area.
In 2014, the United Kingdom had the following 13
GMP plants with 56 manufacturing clean rooms: Cancer
Research UK, Biotherapeutics Development Unit (Hert-
fordshire); Cellular Therapeutics Ltd (Manchester); Guy's
& St Thomas' Hospital, GMP Facility (London); Impe-
rial College London, John Goldman Centre for Cellular
Therapy (London); Kings College London, Rayne Cell
Therapy Suite (London); King's College London, Cell
Therapy Unit, Clinical Research Facility (London);
National Health Service (NHS) Blood and Transplant-
Speke (Liverpool); Scottish Centre for Regenerative
Medicine (Roslin Cells and Scottish National Blood
Transfusion Service; Edinburgh); University College
London, Great Ormond Street Hospital Cellular Therapy
Laboratories (London); Moorﬁelds Eye Hospital, Insti-
tute of Ophthalmology, Cells for Sight Advanced Ther-
apy Medicinal Products Manufacturing Unit (London);
University of Newcastle Biomanufacturing Facility (New-
castle); Intercytex Ltd (Manchester); and University of
Oxford, Clinical Biomanufacturing Facility (Oxford).12
Of these, at least 8 are public sector or academic based,
and Intercytex has now ceased operations.
In response to gaps in the value chain, the UK gov-
ernment set up the Cell and Gene Therapy Catapult
(CGTC) with a remit to provide: innovation infrastruc-
ture (the new cGMP plant in Stevenage, UK); support
for further investment in RM through grants; and
advice on regulation, clinical trial design, and business1088management. A respondent from an immunotherapy
development ﬁrm noted, "[The CGTC is a] perfect
model for us. . . . Because [of] what it does, it de-risks
the manufacturing for us. . . . We do not have to invest
in building our own [cGMP] building, so we do not
have that cost. . . . So you push the risk, the point at
which you have to invest your own money in a build-
ing, further down the development pathway."
The CGTC's Stevenage plant represents public
investment in innovation infrastructure that covers a
value chain gap while also de-risking early stage devel-
opment for under-resourced SMEs. Thus, SMEs delay
early risky investment in cGMP plants until they have
demonstrated proof of concept, efﬁcacy, and tolerabil-
ity, making them more attractive to investment by
venture capitalists. However, the United Kingdom still
has limited capacity for manufacturing cells for clinical
use; manufacturers can produce batch sizes for treating
only 50 patients at most. Cognizant of this fact, the
UK government set up the Advanced Therapies
Manufacturing Taskforce, which produced the
Advanced Therapies Manufacturing Action Plan,
focusing on "retaining and attracting advanced thera-
pies manufacture into the UK."13 In addition, there are
harmonization and collaborative efforts by organiza-
tions such as the London Regenerative Medicine Net-
work and the CGTC.
Clinical Adoption Gaps—Public Investment in
Trialing Clinical Adoption
There is also a lack of cooperation between therapy
manufacturers and end-use clinicians regarding what
clinical adoption of the therapy will look like. The level
of cooperation depends on therapy type; for example,
tissue engineering would need more intimate collabora-
tion between the NHS and the RM therapy provider,
as the procedure involves seeding a preprocessed scaf-
fold with autologous cultured cells, and potentially sev-
eral rounds of surgery, which require the training of
surgeons in procedures. A respondent of our survey,
from a tissue engineering ﬁrm, stated, "We work very
closely with the surgeon. So, we are restoring anatomy
as well as function. I guess, we have two components
we have to ﬁt together; . . . it is not just cells, it is not
just scaffold. We have to ﬁt them both together in a
way that will work."
Immunotherapies may not require the same level of
collaboration. However, clinical care is important for
managing a potential cytokine storm response inVolume 40 Number 7
G. Banda et al.patients. Figure 2 illustrates, in immunotherapy, the
close collaboration between the clinic and manufac-
turers with regard to scheduling, logistics, testing, and
product release activities. The patient goes into the
clinic and undergoes leukapheresis for the harvesting
of T cells, which are modiﬁed and manufactured for
delivery to the patient, who may spend, on average, 3
to 7 days in the hospital. Prior to therapy, the patient
would have been preconditioned with chemotherapy
to down-regulate his or her T cells. The T cells are
modiﬁed in the manufacturing center, which works in
close collaboration with the clinic.
The ﬁndings from our study indicate that not all
hospitals are able to offer RM therapies. The UKFigure 2. Immunotherapy using chimeric antigen recepto
between the clinic and manufacturing with regar
activities (blue arrows and boxes). The patient go
harvesting of T cells, which are modiﬁed and ma
on average, 3 to 7 days in the hospital (green arr
July 2018government has, as a result, invested in advanced ther-
apy clinical centers to build models on how RM ther-
apy will work in hospital settings. Indications from our
interviews are that RM therapies may be offered in
regional centers. However, the nature of advanced
therapy clinical centers is yet to be established.
Translational Services Gaps—Public Investment in
Advisory Service
One ﬁrm we studied had identiﬁed a need in the
industry and had re-engineered its business model from
a contract manufacturing organization (CMO) to a
translational services business model offering advisory
services for RM-related businesses. It had becomer technology (CAR-T) illustrates close cooperation
d to scheduling, logistics, testing, and product release
es into the clinic and undergoes leukapheresis for the
nufactured for delivery to the patient, who may spend,
ows and boxes).
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Clinical Therapeuticscash-neutral but then became unviable when a better-
resourced, publicly funded entity, the CGTC, began
delivering a similar service. The paradox is that the
CGTC, as part of the innovation ecosystem, was set up
as a national response to ﬁll gaps in the value chain for
RM development. The ﬁrm could not compete with a
well-funded institution: "The CGTC said, 'We are going
to build a manufacturing facility. We are going to be a
CMO. We are going to provide regulatory advice; we
are providing business development advice. We have
research labs.' And they put £100 million ($133.8 mil-
lion) into it. We could not compete with that."
This example highlights the tension between the inno-
vation ecosystem policy and practice interventions that
bridge value chain gaps and the need to balance this with
allowing enough "space" for smaller players to operate
and provide a variety of actors leading to sustainable
value chains. Institutions like the CGTC have a marked
effect on at least 2 business models—manufacturing and
scale-up, and translational service provision. The crucial
question is whether commercial companies will be able
to ﬁll the gap when the government eventually with-
draws funding from such institutions.Technology and Delivery Model Gaps
Different Dynamics for Autologous and Allogeneic
Therapies
The availability of either an autologous or an alloge-
neic therapy will inﬂuence the manufacturing model,
distance of manufacturing sites from the clinic, distri-
bution model, and achievement of economies of scale.
Autologous economies of scale can be achieved by
what one industry expert termed scale-out—processing
many autologous samples at the same time; however,
scale-out carries the risk for cross-contamination com-
pared to scale-up for allogeneic therapies. Scale-out
depends on closed-system automated manufacturing to
avoid contamination, which requires timely coevolu-
tion of allied technologies/innovations. As a result,
allogeneic therapies are deemed more commercially
viable; however, some players choose to develop the
autologous therapies ﬁrst because the regulatory and
manufacturing routes of autologous therapies are less
demanding than are those of allogeneic therapies. An
interviewee reported that allogeneic therapy was sub-
ject to stricter regulatory processes compared to autol-
ogous therapy: "The reason is really learning as we go
along, it was always the concept that allogeneic was1090likely to be the easier way to commercialize to scale up
and produce large amounts of drug product and sell
drug product at low price or relatively low price and be
able to make a big enough proﬁt for the commercial
case for investors. But it is a longer route, . . . regulatory
approval of an allogeneic product in Europe, and so we
decided to start with an autologous product as a proof
of concept that this could work. We have done that,
we have treated the ﬁrst 5 patients, and we have col-
lected 2-year data in some cases and 1 year in all cases.
And we have enough evidence to say as a product it
appears to work; now we want to turn it into a much
more commercially viable product. . .. So we have a
new Innovate UK grant which is focused on turning
the autologous product into an allogeneic product and
we have just started that."
Thus, the stringency of a regulatory process can
direct innovation into certain directions, which may
not be optimal and may be wasteful of resources and
time in the early exit Phase I/II or virtual business mod-
els. A tissue engineering ﬁrm also reported choosing
the autologous approach because "the cell therapy
guys would say, 'Well, we've got more tolerability and
regulatory concerns to deal with because you're giving
a cell therapy that's . . . allogeneic rather than autolo-
gous.' So, we chose autologous because it is safer, and
from a regulatory perspective, as well it is also easier."
A CMO pointed out that it can take 6 to 12 months to
develop expertise in a new cell therapy manufacture
for highly competent and versatile players. Therefore,
switching source material results in signiﬁcant delays
in bringing products to market. We discuss issues of
regulatory pressure on innovation subsequently.
RM Logistics Issues
The second technology and delivery model issue is the
logistics challenge for both autologous and allogeneic
therapies. There is a cryopreservation technology chal-
lenge as well as working out efﬁcient distribution systems
for RM therapies. All respondents identiﬁed the need to
develop better cryopreservation techniques that enhance
long-term cell viability for allogeneic therapies and in
some cases for autologous therapies. Thawing proce-
dures also need to be easier for clinical staff. There is a
technology limitation, as current state-of-the-art cryo-
preservation may not be good enough for certain thera-
pies. Also, scheduling and coordination between
manufacturers and clinicians need to be optimized. A
respondent from a cell therapy ﬁrm carrying out clinicalVolume 40 Number 7
G. Banda et al.trials spoke of adverse weather affecting their operations:
"I remember one winter when all the cells froze in the
van we had, the temperature dipped down because the
driver parked the car at his house halfway up to Edin-
burgh overnight and everything just froze because it was
10°C. ...It was the ﬁrst time I realized how important
the logistics are in these things."
Cryopreservation and logistics affect business per-
formance. A respondent with US and UK RM knowl-
edge reported that the dermal substitute Dermagraft
(Organogenesis, Canton, Massachusetts), which sold
for $1000/unit, was cryopreserved, whereas Appligraf
(Organogenesis), which sold for about $800/unit, was
not. Shipping and storing a cryopreserved product
were more expensive, and the cost of acquiring the
80°C freezer was borne by the cell therapy provider.
Clinicians complained of the noise and heat that the
freezer generated, and that thawing introduced a risk
for mishandling the product. While Dermagraft had a
shelf-life of over a year, Appligraf had a shelf-life of
5 days. Consequently, the respondent said, "It was
expensive to hold Dermagraft stock for long periods,
and accountants were not happy because salesmen
were 'stufﬁng the pipe,' that is, they would buy a year's
supply of products now and get a volume discount."
The result was that short-term sales went up and long-
term sales suffered. This example illustrates some of
the systemic technology and delivery challenges that
the UK RM sector will need to resolve.
National Regulatory and Reimbursement Systems
The ﬁndings from our study show that ﬁrms in the
RM sector are currently focusing on resolving
manufacturing and clinical trial issues but neglecting
reimbursement and health care adoption. All of the
ﬁrms actively developing therapies said that reimburse-
ment is further down the road and that they would
consider it more carefully when the time came. A
respondent from a cell therapy ﬁrm, with UK and US
experience, highlighted the health technology assess-
ment and affordability challenge, especially when
national health care systems are ﬁnancially con-
strained. He cited the example of diabetes and ques-
tioned whether the health care system could afford a
high upfront payment for a therapy compared to the
current small costs spread over the lifetime of a patient.
A shift in the Medicaid reimbursement model in the
United States had a negative effect on Organogenesis.
The respondent reported that "instead of payingJuly 2018whatever the clinician claimed, they [Medicaid] said
treating venous leg ulcer will cost so much; it's up to
you how you ﬁx it. This was way less than was being
reimbursed for Appligraf and Dermagraft. This exam-
ple caused huge problems for Organogenesis [and
affected their manufacturing capabilities]." Reimburse-
ment of the cost of therapies is a value chain gap that
needs to be addressed. One of the ﬁrms we interviewed
commissioned a reimbursement study in the United
Kingdom, considering quality-adjusted life-years and
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
guidelines, and preliminary results showed that they
could be reimbursed. The National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence also commissioned a mock health
technology assessment for RM therapies. The conclu-
sion was that existing methods of assessment could be
applied to the sector; however, there remain challenges
about clinical evidence.14
The third innovation ecosystem challenge that the
sector faces is different regulators for different markets,
especially if they target European and North American
markets. Evidence from the ﬁeld suggests that Euro-
pean regulatory authorities are considered more strin-
gent on cGMP requirements earlier on in development
compared with the Food and Drug Administration in
the United States. The ﬁrms argue that it is possible in
the United States to avoid GMP right up to early stage
clinical trials, whereas in Europe, that happens much
earlier. The second issue highlighted by one of the ﬁrms
that we studied was that European ﬁrms may have to
start from scratch with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, and would have to collaborate with an American
company to accelerate approval. Turning to the Euro-
pean setting, the ﬁrms reported that they get central
regulatory approval from the European Medicines
Agency (EMA), but they require nation-by-nation
reimbursement, with each applying different criteria,
making this expensive for under-resourced RM ﬁrms.
However, in their discussion of regulatory systems in
Europe, Japan, and the United States, Milne et al15
reported that there are attempts at harmonization.Disproportionate and Nonadaptive Governance
Systems
First-Mover Disadvantages of Regulatory Learning
and Costs
The ﬁndings from our study indicate that some RM
pioneering ﬁrms face a ﬁrst-mover disadvantage as1091
Clinical Therapeuticsthey bear the costs of learning how to manage the regu-
latory process, and that of helping the regulators to
learn, with beneﬁts accruing to follower innovators.
According to a pioneering cell therapy ﬁrm in the
United Kingdom, "Initially, it was very tricky for us,
because the regulators hadn't really seen much of this
before. So in some senses, we were pioneering the regu-
latory pathway, by almost being the ﬁrst in. Certainly,
that was the case with some of the interactions we had
here in the United Kingdom. So the regulatory system
has got a lot easier here in the United Kingdom—or
more efﬁcient, would be the better word to use. And
the efﬁciency has led to . . . the process has just become
more manageable, in terms of . . . submit[ting] applica-
tions for regulatory approval, the . . . number of bodies
that . . . [the] application has to go through. It used to
be much more cumbersome in the UK than it is now.
And I think the UK's deﬁnitely got its act together
there."
Trust develops as regulators and pioneering innova-
tors work together, a phenomenon that, at a work-
shop, a representative from the Medicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency called the fel-
low traveler concept, in which regulators acknowledge
that they learn from innovators, as it is likely that, in
niche areas, innovators know more than do the regula-
tors. Some ﬁrms acknowledged that when they started,
they did not know what the regulator wanted and they
were unsure of the stance they would take on a particu-
lar issue, especially in situations without precedents.
However, ﬁrms pointed out that the regulatory process
is still expensive, which can hinder innovation. For
example, one ﬁrm reported that the regulator informed
them that they had to run trials in in vivo animal mod-
els, and the trials had serious limitations and did not
deliver useful data. They felt that use of in-vivo animal
models was wasteful of animals, money, and time, but
they had no option because that was the advice from
the regulator. Another ﬁrm argued that regulators can
be accommodative of innovators if one knows what he
or she is doing. They sought clinical trial variation for
an immunotherapy and obtained it. The accommoda-
tion by the regulator may have worked for them
because of their extensive in-house regulatory experi-
ence and long-term liaison with the regulators, which
could have built trust.
Turning to standards, we found that ﬁrst-movers'
advantage could be obtained by "gold-plating" stand-
ards or regulations. Pioneers could set higher standards1092than are required as a competitive tool and barrier for
entry (see Tait and Banda5 for a detailed discussion on
standards in cell therapies). Reinforcing this aspect,
one respondent reported that in-house regulatory staff
have 2 employers: the ﬁrm and the regulator. They can
change their employer but the regulator remains the
same, and as a result, they are motivated to preserve
their reputation with the regulator by being overly
stringent, thereby gold-plating standards.
Limited Patient Numbers for Clinical Trials
Limited numbers of patients with rare indications
lead to challenges in designing clinical trials. For
example, epidermolysis bullosa has a prevalence of
1 in 1 million (about 60 patients in the United King-
dom). If 8 clinical trials were required, the RM ﬁrms
would run out of patients. One ﬁrm that was inter-
viewed had only 11 patients and could not proceed
further with clinical trials. Small patient numbers are
especially difﬁcult for under-resourced SMEs running
either the virtual or early exit Phase I/II business mod-
els because they cannot afford to recruit patients out-
side of the United Kingdom. However, Faulkner16
reported that regulatory systems are now being
adapted for rare indications, and Mittra et al17 argue
that the usual approach for indications such as b-thal-
assemia is to choose a country with a patient popula-
tion sufﬁcient for the clinical trial.
A related issue is shifting goals for later-comer
therapies in clinical trials as standards of care
improve. A respondent from a cell therapy ﬁrm
informed us that the effects of Organogenesis'
Appligraf therapy were measured against those of
standard therapy for venous leg ulcers at that time,
an Unna paste boot (zinc oxide paste, with an elas-
tic wraparound), Appligraf easily passed. On the
other hand, a therapy from Advanced BioHealing
(La Jolla, California) failed in Phase III clinical trials
because its effects did not reach statistical signiﬁ-
cance compared to those of a 4-layer compression
bandage (Smith and Nephew, London, UK), which
had become the standard of care and was more efﬁ-
cacious than was the Unna paste boot. In this case,
the pioneer had ﬁrst-mover advantage as the bar
was raised for subsequent competing therapies. This
experience is common among companies and
researchers working on the frontier of innovation
when they are unaware of a competing innovation
emerging from a different ﬁeld of science.Volume 40 Number 7
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This article has identiﬁed a number of gaps in the value
chains required for delivering RM therapies to various
markets, and in the innovation ecosystem, that will
need to be tailored to more effectively meet the needs
of small and large companies innovating in this area. If
government supports were removed, current RM value
chains would not be viable.
This articles has focused on gaps that are holding
back the development of the integrated value chains
that will be needed for RM therapies to become inde-
pendently viable treatments. We have identiﬁed 3 value
chainrelated gaps—manufacturing, translational
services, and clinical adoption—and public investment
is currently bridging these gaps. Speciﬁc areas requiring
attention include re-engineering the dynamics of distri-
bution and logistics in cell therapies, the coevolution of
supporting expertise (eg, in cryopreservation, surgical
and medical skills), increasing the scale and quality of
manufacturing facilities, and cultivating and support-
ing end-user markets.
For issues arising in the innovation ecosystem, we
have considered regulation and how it can channel
innovation unintentionally in certain directions. Impor-
tant factors are the ﬁrst-mover disadvantage, in which
pioneers incur severe regulatory learning costs, and the
ﬁrst-mover advantage, in which pioneers are able to
gold-plate standards to make life more difﬁcult than
necessary for followers. Clinical trials also present
problems for innovative companies in terms of the
need for recruiting patient numbers large enough to
meet the requirements of a regulatory system designed
for large-scale medical indications. The different
requirements of regulatory systems in different national
jurisdictions are also inhibiting international collabora-
tion in RM development.TAGGEDH1CONCLUSIONSTAGGEDEND
The ﬁndings from this study highlight the needs for (1)
more systemic analyses of the needs of potentially dis-
ruptive innovations, in RM and more widely; and (2)
policymakers to give greater attention to these insights
in planning regulatory and other supporting initiatives,
with the promotion of innovation in mind. Some of the
general manufacturing and translational challenges are
beginning to be addressed by organizations in the
United Kingdom, such as the CGTC, London Regener-
ative Medicine Network, and speciﬁc centers that haveJuly 2018been set up for this purpose, including, for example,
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Coun-
cil's Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Rege-
nerative Medicine, Loughborough University
(Loughborough); the Centre for Regenerative Medi-
cine, University of Bath (Bath); and the UK Regenera-
tive Medicine Platform (https://www.ukrmp.org.uk/
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